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NOTES
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION OF WITNESSES
IN MINNESOTA
While the law of impeachment is in many respects well settled
and uniform throughout the country there are areas in which the
Minnesota law is as yet unsetled or in which it differs from that
of other jurisdictions. There are also areas in which revision of the
present law seems necessary, 'especially in view of the modern
tendency of the courts to admit all evidence having probative value
unless it should be excluded on clear grounds of policy.' It is the
purpose of this Note to examine and evaluate the Minnesota law on
this subject with these views in mind.
1. Kauffman, Impeachment cizd Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Mary-
land, 7 Md. L. Rev. 118 (1943).
NOTES
I. BIAS, INTEREST AND CORRUPTION
A. Bias
Evidence of the bias of a witness is always admissible and may
be offered by cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence. 2 Bias in-
cludes both prejudice for and hostility against a party and is in
many cases an effective means of impeachment since it shows a
motive or reason why the witness could be lying. As stated by Wig-
more, the range of circumstances from which bias may be inferred
is infinite ;3 some of the more common examples are: a prior law-
suit between a witness and a party, 4 a statement of a witness indicat-
ing a desire to see the opponent defeated,5 and facts indicating an
attitude of vengeance or jealousy of the witness against a party.
The first difficulty that arises in attempting to show bias is the
question of the admissibility of facts from which bias can be inferred
but which do not necessarily establish such bias. While the Minne-
sota decisions are in some conflict,7 the principle seems clear that
the problem should be reduced to a consideration of whether the
evidence offered is too remote to show a probable bias and should
be left largely to the discretion of the trial court."
The question arises whether the cause and details of the bias
may be shown. It is necessary to distinguish between situations
where the inquiry is made on cross-examination by the party show-
ing the bias and where it is made on redirect examination to re-
habilitate the witness. In the former case the cause and details of
the bias may be elicited to show the nature and elicited to show the
2. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 948 (3d ed. 1940).
3. 3 id. § 950.
4. See Timm v. Schneider, 203 Minn. 1, 279 N. W. 754 (1938).
5. See Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 113 N. W. 690 (1907).
6. See State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 289 N. W. 575 (1940).
7. The rule of the earlier cases was that only facts such as threats and
quarrels which directly tend to establish bias could be shown, but not facts
from which only the inference of bias could be drawn. Wischstadt v. Wisch-
stadt, 47 Minn. 358, 50 N. W. 225 (1891) (admission of evidence of pend-
ing lawsuit by plaintiff against witness held error) ; see State v. Bilansky,
3 Minn. 246 (169), 260-261 (179-180) (1859) (facts tending to show that
the witness and the defendant shared the affections of the same man and
that therefore jealousy existed properly excluded). The rule has since been
extended, however. E.g.. State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 289 N. W. 575
(1940) (illicit relationship of party and witness admissible) ; Timm v.
Schneider, 203 Minn. 1, 279 N. W. 754 (1938) (evidence of former lawsuit
admissible) ; but see State v. Hurst, 153 Minn. 525, 193 N. W. 680 (1922)
(extended evidence of membership of witness in opposing faction of labor
strike properly excluded since collateral) ; State v. Hartung, 141 Minn. 207,
169 N. W. 712 (1918) (evidence of minor argument excluded since on im-
material matter).
8. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 949.
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nature and extent of the hostility. In the latter case the witness
should be allowed to show that the hostility does not exist but
should not be allowed to show that it exists but was justified by the
opponent's conduct since this would tend to confuse the issues and
might unduly prejudice the character of the witness or his op-
ponent.' 0
The question of whether it is necessary to lay the foundation
usually required for a prior inconsistent statement" when the former
utterance shows bias remains unsettled in Minnesota. 12 Wigmore's
position is that from considerations of fairness the attention of the
witness should be directed to the former statement before extrinsic
evidence is introduced but he states that since the rule requiring
such foundation has been so frequently abused by courts it should
not be extended to a field where it is not required by precedent.'3
B. Interest
At early common law a person who had a pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the action was precluded from appearing as a wit-
ness. 14 This rule has long since been abolished in all jurisdictions,r
but while such persons may now testify, the fact of their interest
may be shown to affect their credibility.16 Common examples of
the proper showing of interest in criminal cases are evidence that
immunity was promised to an accomplice who testified against the
defendant 1 7 and evidence that a witness for the state is a paid de-
tective ;18 in civil cases the interest shown is usually a financial
9. State v. Dee, 14 Minn. 35 (27) (1869); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §
951. Wigmor.e states that the trial court should have the discretion to limit
the evidence, however.
10. State v. Kight, 106 Minn. 371, 119 N. W. 56 (1908); Town of
Wells v. Sullivan, 119 Minn. 389, 138 N. W. 305 (1912). But cf. State v.
Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N. W. 773, cert. denied, 257 U. S. 643 (1921).
11. See note 25 infra and text thereto.
12. The point was raised, but not decided in State v. Dee, 14 Minn. 35(27), 40 (31) (1869), and left expressly open in Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn.
346, 350, 113 N. W. 690, 692 (1907).
13. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 953.
14. 2 id. §§ 575-576; Jones, Evidence §§ 712, 726 (3d ed. 1924).
15. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949). See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488. This
is subject, however, to the limitation that an interested witness can not testify
to the conversations of a deceased or an insane person. Minn. Stat. § 595.04
(1949).
16. E.g., Olson v. Moorhead, 142 Minn. 267, 171 N. W. 923 (1919);
State v. Tosney, 26 Minn. 262, 3 N. W. 345 (1879) ; see Flick v. Ellis-Hall
Co., 138 Minn. 364, 367-368, 165 N. W. 135, 137 (1917).
17. State v. Madden, 161 Minn. 132, 201 N. W. 297 (1924).
18. State v. Tosney, 26 Minn. 262, 3 N. W. 345 (1879) ; see State v.
Blake, 176 Minn. 305, 306, 223 N. W. 141 (1929).
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stake in the outcome of the trial.'0 The court may properly instruct
the jury to consider the interest of the witness in weighing his
credibility.'-" If the evidence offered is relevant, the fact that such
evidence does not necessarily establish interest should not preclude
its admission since, if it is actually worthless for that purpose, no
harm has been done by its admission.2 1
C. Corruption
A witness may always be impeached by evidence tending to show
that he is disposed to testify falsely for gain.2 2 The ordinary evidence
of this includes receipt of money for testifying, an offer to testify
falsely for money, and an attempt to suborn another witness.23 Such
facts may be brought out either on cross-examination or by the
introduction of extrinsic evidence.2
4
II. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The most commonly used and probably the most effective means
of discrediting a witness is by showing that he has previously made
statements inconsistent with his present testimony. If the prior
statement was verbal it is necessary on cross-examination to ask
the witness if he has made such a statement and sufficiently direct
his attention to the time, place, and circumstances, thereby giving
him an opportunity to explain.2" While this rule has been much too
rigidly applied and treated as an arbitrary requisite in many juris-
dictions,'O the Mlinesota court has taken the realistic position that,
19. Olson v. Moorhead, 142 Minn. 267, 171 N. W. 923 (1919) (attorney
who testified was retained on a contingent fee) ; Flick v. Ellis-Hall Co., 138
Minn. 364, 165 N. W. 135 (1917) (plaintiff's husband who testified had
agreement to share proceeds of action).
20. State v. Ames, 90 Minn. 183, 96 N. W. 330 (1903) ; State v. Lucy, 41
Minn. 60, 42 N. W. 697 (1889). The court's charge, however, should be
general and not reflect on the credibility of a particular witness. State v.
Hoy, 83 Minn. 286, 86 N. W. 98 (1901) ; Harriott v. Holmes, 77 Minn. 245,
79 N. W. 1003 (1899).
21. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 969.
22. Alward v. Oakes, 63 Minn. 190, 65 N. W. 270 (1895) ; State v. Tall,
43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W. 449 (1890).
23. 3 XVigmore, Evidence § 956.
24. Alward v. Oakes, 63 Minn. 190, 65 N. W. 270 (1895) ; State v. Tall,
43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W. 449 (1890).
25. State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132 (125) (1868) ; see Horton v. Chad-
bourn, 31 Minn. 322, 323, 17 N. W. 865, 866 (1883) ; Castner v. Gunther,
6 Minn. 119 (63), 134 (80) (1861).
26. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1029; Hale, Impeachment of Wit-
,esses by Prior Inconsistent Statements, 10 So. Calif. L. Rev. 135 (1937)
(interpreting California Code provisions) ; Kauffman, Impeachment and Re-
habilitation of Witnesses in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 118, 132 n. 61 (1943).
1952] NOTES
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since the reason for the rule is to preclude possible unfair surprise,27
the foundation need not be perfect so long as the witness is not
misled. 28
If the prior inconsistency is contained in a document, the docu-
ment must be shown or read aloud to the witness as part of the
foundation. This is the rule of The Queen's Case20 and apparently
is still the law in Minnesota.3 0 The rule is uniformly criticized3'
as being unsound both in principle and policy and serving no other
function than to protect the shifty and dishonest witness. The re-
quirement of foundation should be the same whether the prior in-
consistency was written or oral; that is, that the attention of the
witness should be directed to the prior statement in a manner suf-
ficient to preclude unfair surprise. It is not necessary to lay the
foundation where the witness is a party since the statements may
be introduced as admissions as vell as to impeach. 2 As stated above,
the question of whether the foundation is necessary when the prior
statement shows fraud or bias remains unsettled in Minnesota.
Only if the witness denies making the statement can the incon-
sistency be introduced, 3 but this denial need not be absolute and it
is sufficient if the witness does not remember making the state-
ment.2 4 Neither does the degree of variance between the prior state-
ment and the present testimony determine the admissibility. If it
differs in any material respect, it may be introduced.3 5 The prior
27. An additional reason that is sometimes given is that the laying of
the foundation saves time since, if the witness admits the inconsistency, the
matter is at an end. Maguire, Evidence 54-55 (1947).
28. E.g., Newton v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 186 Minn. 439, 243 N. W.
684 (1932) ; State v. Jensen, 151 Minn. 174, 186 N. W. 581 (1922) ; John-
son v. Young, 127 Minn. 462, 149 N. W. 940 (1914).
29. 2 B. & B. 284, 286-290 (C.P. 1820). While the rule has been
abolished in England, it is still irfluential in this country. See iaguire,
Evidence 56-57 (1947).
30. Milliren v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 186 Minn. 115, 242 N. W. 546(1932).
31. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1260; Maguire, Evidence 56-57 (1947)
Morgan, Foreward, Model Code of Evidence 21-22 (1942). The Model Code
in rule 106 (1) abolishes the rule.
32. E.g., Williams v. Jayne, 210 Minn. 594, 299 N. W. 893 (1941);
Johnson v. Farrell, 210 Minn. 351, 298 N. W. 256 (1941); see McManus
v. Nichols-Chrisholm Lumber Co., 105 Minn. 144, 147, 117 N. W. 223, 224
(1908).
33. In re Estate of Jache, 199 Minn. 177, 271 N. W. 452 (1937). Wig-
more argues that even if the witness admits making the inconsistent state-
ment the cross-examiner should not be precluded from emphasizing the
point by his own witnesses, since the purpose of the preliminary question is
to warn the witness and not to prove the statement. 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1037.
34. Koop v. Great Northern Ry., 224 Minn. 286, 28 N. W. 2d 687
(1947), see State v. Nelson, 91 Minn. 143, 148, 97 N. W. 652, 654 (1903).
35. Tinklepaugh v. Rounds, 24 Minn. 298 (1877).
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statement cannot be introduced, however, if the inconsistency relates
to a collateral matter.36 The ultimate determination of what is col-
lateral rests within the discretion of the trial court, but the test is
that the matter is collateral of the cross-examiner could not intro-
duce it in his case in chief., The question has arisen whether the
witness can be impeached on a prior statement involving his opinion
rather than the underlying facts and it has been held that the opinion
rule has no application in this situation since the statement is of-
fered to impeach and not as substantive evidence.38
When a witness has been impeached by the showing of a prior
inconsistent statement he cannot be rehabilitated by showing prior
statements consistent with his testimony.3 9 The reason usually
given for this rule is that the prior consistent statements have no
probative value since they do not alter the fact that the witness
was inconsistent.40 Where the witness has denied making the in-
consistent statement, however, as is usually the case, proof that he
made prior statements is logically relevant to support the credibility
of his denial and there seems to be no good reason for excluding
them.4
In Minnesota, as in most jurisdictions,4 2 an exception is recog-
nized and prior consistent statements are allowed under the "recent
contrivance" or "supervening influence" doctrine. The theory of
this doctrine is that prior consistent statements are allowable to
rebut an assertion that the present testimony is a recent fabrication
motivated by some influence that did not exist at the time the prior
consistent statement was made. This principle is illustrated in
Sullivan v. Minneapolis Street Ry.,4 a personal injury action by
a passenger on a streetcar, in which the decisive issue was whether
36. E.g., State v. Marx, 139 Minn. 448, 166 N. W. 1082 (1918);
Murphy v. Backer, 67 Minn. 510, 70 N. W. 799 (1897).
37. Campbell v. Aarstad, 124 Minn. 284, 144 N. W. 956 (1914); see
State v. Jenkins, 171 Minn. 173, 175, 213 N. W. 923, 924 (1927).
38. Uggen v. Bazille & Partridge, 123 Minn. 97, 143 N. W. 112 (1913)(quoting Wigmore).
39. E.g., Barrett v. Van Duzee, 139 Minn. 351, 166 N. W. 407 (1918);
George Gorton Machine Co. v. Grignon, 137 Minn. 378, 163 N. W. 748
(1917) ; State v. La Bar, 131 Minn. 432, 155 N. W. 211 (1915).
40. Maguire, Evidence 61-62 (1947) ; see also Jones, Evidence § 869
(3d ed. 1924).
41. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1126; Maguire, Evidence 62 (1947);
McCormick, Cases on Evidence 172 n. 84 (2d ed. 1948).
42. Jones, Evidence § 870 (3d ed. 1924).
43. 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922 (1924). The recent contrivance doc-
trine has been recognized, but not applied on the facts in the following cases:
In re Estate of Ylijarvi, 186 Minn. 288, 290-291, 243 N. W. 103, 104 (1932) ;
State v. Jackson, 181 Minn. 68, 70, 231 N. W. 721, 722 (1930) ; State v. La
Bar, 131 Minn. 432, 434, 155 N. W. 211, 212 (1915); cf. State v. Taran,
176 Minn. 175, 222 N. W. 906 (1929).
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an emergency stop was justified. The conductor testified that the
- sudden stop was made necessary by the unexpected movement of
a truck from a curb. The defendent was allowed to introduce an
emergency stop report made immediately after the accident which
in part substantiated this testimony. On appeal the admission of
the report was affirmed on the theory that plaintiff's counsel had
asserted that the testimony in respect to the truck was a false alibi
and that since the report was made before the conductor knew
that anyone was injured it could be introduced to rebut the implica-
tion of a recent contrivance. In this case, however, the witness had
not been impeached by the showing of a prior inconsistent statement
and the imputation of recent fabrication was not made until the
closing argument when the stop report had already been introduced.
The questions, therefore, of when during the course of the trial
the charge of recent fabrication must be made and, further, whether
the introduction of a prior inconsistent statements could in itself be
enough to bring the case within the exception44 have not been an-
swered in Minesota. It would seem that rather than extend the
tenuous concepts of this exception the rule itself should be abolished.
III. REPUTATION FOR TRUTH AND VERACITY
The bad reputation of a witness for truth and veracity may be
shown to discredit him.4 5 While the showing of such reputation
serves a useful function in the law b r calling to the attention of the
trier of fact what might otherwise be an unknown deficiency in the
witness, 4 the effectiveness of -this means of impeachment is often
questionable. A reputation for lack of truthfulness, while having
probative value and therefore being legally relevant, is yet quite
removed from establishing that the winess is testifying falsely in a
given case. The tactical considerations47 involved in this type of
impeachment to a degree outweigh the rules of law that attend the
problem.
The Minnesota court in State v. Pahnersten4 s has set out the
legal requirements for qualifying the impeaching witness: he must
44. McCormick indicates that attack by prior inconsistent statement al-
ways implys "recent contrivance" unless counsel disclaims it, and that con-
sistent statements inade prior to the alleged inconsistencies should therefore
be admitted. McCormick, Cases on Evidence 172 n. 84 (2d ed. 1948).
45. See e.g., Buse v. Page, 32 Minn. 111, 19 N. W. 736 (1884) ; Rudsdill
v. Slingerland, 18 Minn. 380 (342) (1872) ; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn.
249 (232) (1868).
46. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa L.
Rev. 498, 534 (1939).
47. See generally Goldstein, Trial Technique §§ 612-620 (1935).
48. 210 Minn. 476, 482, 299 N. W. 669, 672 (1941).
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first be asked if he is familiar with the reputation of the witness
for truthfulness in the community where he resides; secondly, what
that reputation is; and finally, whether from his knowlege of such
reputation he would believe the witness under oath. While these
three questions compose the minimum requirements of the founda-
tion, the court did not intend thereby to limit the preliminary
questioning, and this much alone would scarcely be adequate to
effectively discredit a witness. Dean Ladd suggests seven additional
questions to accomplish this purpose both from the tactical and
the legal standpoints.49
The ultimate opinion of the impeaching witness in respect to
whether he would believe the witness under oath must be based
on general community reputation, 0 and this reputation must be
current.51 The opponent's counsel is, of course, entitled to cross-
49. (The impeaching witness is referred to as W, and the principle
witness who is to be impeached as A).
(1) General questions should first be asked with particular stress on
how long TV has lived in the community, and his position in the community
as indicated by his occupation and family.
(2) General questions should next be asked to show that V knew A
personally and the length of time and place where he knew him.
(3) "Mr. TV, have you heard remarks or comments concerning A made
by people generally in and about the community of Z town?"
(4) "Have these remarks or comments been many or few in number?"
(5) "Were these persons members of some particular group of people?
Answer. No. The remarks which I have heard came from various individuals
in different occupations in the community."
(6) "Over how long a period of time have you heard comment and
talk about A by people generally in and about Z towvn? Answer. For the last
several years and quite recently."
(7) "Have the comments and remarks which you have heard about A
related to his veracity?"
These questions would then be followed by questions similar to those in
the text. Question (2) is asked to identify A particularly as the person at
whom the comments heard by TV were directed, and also to identify A as
living in a particular place during a specified time. This question would also
serve the incidental function of showing that W agrees with the community
reputation of A.
Question (3) is designed to prove that A was talked about generally in
the community. Question (5) is important since it establishes that the com-
ments do not come from a limited group and may forestall cross-examination
until the question sequence is completed. Question (6) serves both to show
that it is a long-standing reputation and that it exists at the present time.
Question (7) would of course be necessary in finnesota since reputation for
general moral character cannot be shown.
See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa L.
Rev. 498, 518-527 (1939).
50. State v. Palmersten, 210 Minn. 476, 299 N. W. 669 (1941).
51. Exactly what constitutes "current" seems to be quite discretionary
with the trial court. In State v. Bryant, 97 Mfinn. 8, 105 N. W. 974 (1905)
evidence was properly excluded where the witness had had no knowledge
for the preceding four years, but in Buse v. Page, 32 Minn. 111, 19 Minn.
736 (1884) evidence was properly admitted although that witness similarly
had no knowledge for the preceding four years.
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examine the witness on these qualifications before the ultimate
opinion is given. 2 The phrase "reputation in the community where
the witness lives" has apparently not been construed restrictively
in this jurisdiction but other states have taken the view that repu-
tation among business associates and the like are excluded. 3 This
interpretation has been attacked as representing an obsolete mode
of rural living having no justification in present society where a
considerable percentage of the populace resides in large cities and
has in effect no "community reputatioh. '5 4 The rule that an opinion
of a witness of another's reputation must be excluded if based on
personal experience rather than community reputation 55 has also
been criticized. The position taken by the critics is that the con-
sidered opinion of a qualified witness drawn from his own experience
is better evidence than reputation of character based on "hearsay
interchange of gossip and scandal in the community."56
The reputation for general bad character other than that relating
to truth and veracity may not be shown in Minnesota 5 7 although
this is allowed in some jurisdictions.r s Wigmore strongly urges
an exception to this rule in cases involving sexual offenses where
the witness is the female complainant. He argues that in such cases
the witness' reputation for chastity is directly relevant to her dis-
position to falsify her testimony in the action.5 9 The Minnesota
court has rejected this argument for the unconvincing reason that
if evidence of the female complainant's reputation for chastity were
allowed in one type of case, then such evidence could be shown
concerning a female witness in any case.6"
The rehabilitation of a witness who has been impeached on his
reputation for truthfulness is limited. The most effective manner
would be by discrediting the impeaching witness as to his qualifi-
cations concerning the reputation. An inquiry into the motives of
52. See Jones, Evidence § 864 (3d ed. 1924).
53. See Kauffman, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in
Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 118, 124 n. 32 (1943).
54. See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa
L. Rev. 498, 514-515 (1939).
55. See note 50 supra.
56. See Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa
L. Rev. 498, 511 (1939) ; see also 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1986.
57. E.g., State v. Kahner, 217 Minn. 574, 15 N. W. 2d 105 (1944)
Warner v. Lockerby, 31 Minn. 421, 18 N. W. 145 (1884); see Rudsdill v.
Slingerland, 18 Minn. 380 (342), 382-383 (343-344) (1872).
58. Jones, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1924).
59. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 924a.
60. State v. Perry, 151 Minn. 217, 186 N. W. 310 (1922). W Vigmore, of
course, would limit this exception to the female complainant in a case in-
volving a sexual offense.
NOTES
the impeaching witness can also be effective in some cases. 61 More-
over, a showing on rebuttal of the good reputation for truthfulness
of the impeached witness may always be made,6 and the fact that
no motive for the witness to falsify has been presented should always
be stressed in argument.
IV. PRIOR MISCONDUCT
A. In General
The rule in Minnesota and most jurisdictions is that prior mis-
conduct is within the proper scope of inquiry on cross-examination
but that the examiner is bound by the answers of the witness and
the particular acts may not be shown by extrinsic evidence.6 3 The
reasons given for restricting the introduction of extrinsic evidence
are that it will tend to confuse the issues and that the witness cannot
be expected to come into court prepared to rebut all charges of his
supposed prior misconduct. 4
The question of whether all types of misconduct may be the sub-
ject of inquiry or only those types which bear directly on veracity is
left largely to the discretion of the trial court in Minnesota. While
it is impossible to determine or predict with certainty what would be
an abuse of discretion in a given case, the following examples serve
to illustrate the type of problems that arise: it was not an abuse
of discretion in a prosecution for larceny to allow a witness, not the
defendant, to be asked if he had stolen a gun since the case arose ;65
in a civil assault to allow the plaintiff to be asked about a previous
unrelated assault;"6 and in a civil contract action to sustain an
objection to a question to the plaintiff whether he had more than one
61. See Cornelius, Trial Tactics 300-302 (1932). The author states that
the impeaching witness is usually hostile to the original witness but will in
most cases deny this fact. The suggested method of exposing the witness'
hostility is by pointedly asking whether he is a friend or an enemy of the
first witness and if the answer is that he is a friend then to ask if he con-
siders the present mission of besmirching the other's reputation a friendly
act.
62. See State v. O'Connor, 154 Minn. 45, 49, 191 N. W. 50, 51 (1922)
(the court stated, however, that the evidence of good character for truth
and veracity of the witness should not have been admitted in this case
since an attack had not been made on his character for truthfulness) ; see
4 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1104-1105.
63. State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 181 N. W. 850 (1921) ; Campbell
v. Aarstad, 124 Minn. 284, 144 N. W. 956 (1914) ; see State v. Silvers, 230
M inn. 12, 15, 40 N. W. 2d 630, 632 (1950). See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 987.
64. 3 id. § 979.
65. State v. McCartey, 17 Mim. 76 (54) (1871).
66. See Campbell v. Aarstad, 124 Minn. 284, 287, 144 N. W. 956, 957
(1914).
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wife living.6 7 It was an abuse of discretion, however, in a civil action
for the wilful burning of prop arty to allow an extensive inquiry into
the personal habits and morals of the defendant s and in an action
to set aside a deed to allow a witness to be asked if she had deserted
her husband and children thirty-one years before. 9
A distinction must be made in respect to the defendant in a
criminal action. The rule as commonly stated70 is that unless the
defendant introduces evidence of his good character, his character in
respect to the trait involved in the alleged crime may not be inquired
into regardless of whether he testifies; and secondly, that, if the
defendant testifies, his character in respect to credibility is at
issue but not his general character.
When the defendant testifies, the question of what type of con-
duct may be introduced to affect his credibility is again largely dis-
cretionary, 71 but additional considerations must be applied. In State
v. Haney, a prosecution for carnal knowledge, the court stated that:
".... evidence as to independent and disconnected acts may be
received for the specific purpose of affecting the credibility of
the accused if its effect upon credibility is not too remote or if
its probative value is not outweighed by the risk that its admis-
sion will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b)
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) if it does not unfairly
surprise the accused when he has not had reasonable ground
to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. -7 2
67. McArdle v. McArdle, 12 Minn. 98 (53) (1866).
68. Malone v. Stephenson, 94 Minn. 222, 102 N. W. 372 (1905).
69. Howard v. Farr, 115 Minn. 86, 131 N. W. 1071 (1911). The allow-
ance of this question met with the emphatic disapproval of the appellate
court, since it tended to degrade and disgrace the witness and had no
legitimate bearing on veracity. The question of whether a privilege exists
regarding degrading answers, distinct from that against self-incrimination,
was raised in the early case of State v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246 (169) (1859)
where the question tended to show fornication by the witness. The court
after discussing the problem held that it should be left to the discretion of
the trial court. There have apparently been no cases since in which the
question of privilege, as such, has been considered. The history and scope
of the privilege is discussed in 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 984.
70. State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 181 N. W. 850 (1921) ; see State
v. Silvers, 230 Minn. 12, 15,-40 N. W. 2d 630, 632 (1950).
71. The admission of the evidence was held to be within the discretion
of the trial court in the following cases: State v. McTague, 190 Minn. 449,
252 N. W. 446 (1934) (inquiry into past life of accused) ; State v. Quirk,
101 Minn. 334, 112 N. W. 409 (1907) (murder-inquiry into gambling
habits of accused) ; but was held to be an abuse of discretion in the follow-
ing cases: State v. Stockton, 181 Minn. 566, 233 N. W. 307 (1930) (inquiry
into criminal friends of accused) ; State v. Abdo, 165 Minn. 440, 206 N. W.
933 (1926) (carnal knowledge-r--iisconduct of accused with other women) ;
State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 181 N. W. 850 (1921) (murder--extended
inquiry into prior thefts, quarrels, threats, and killings).
72. 219 Minn. 518, 520, 18 N. W. 2d 315, 316 (1945) (citing Model
Code of Evidence, Rule 303).
[Vol. 36:724
NOTES
In this case the prosecution repeatedly cross-examined the de-
fendant about alleged misconduct with other girls, and although
the questions for the most part were excluded the net result was to
prejudice the jury unduly, and a new trial was granted.
B. Prior Convictions
By statute73 in Minnesota a person convicted of a crime shall
nevertheless be a competent witness, but the prior conviction may
be shown to discredit his testimony. The word "crime" in this
section has been defined to mean all felonies and misdemeanors7
with the exception of municipal ordinances 75 and violations of the.
traffic code less than a felony.76 The evidence of the conviction may
be elicited either on cross-examination or by the introduction of
the record of conviction 7 and the nature of the crime may be
brought out.78 The latitude of cross-examination for the purpose
of showing the details of the crime is largely discretionary with the
trial court. 7 The court may properly instruct the jury in respect
to the relation of the conviction to the witness' credibility.8" It is
not proper, however, to show that the witness has been merely
arrested8 ' or indicted.8 -
These rules have the advantage of being clear and well settled,
but the serious disadvantage of being founded on no clear and
convincing principle. It was argued that the statute allowing prior
convictions to be shown should be restricted to those "infamous
crimes" which at common law had disqualified the witness,8 but
the Minnesota court rejected this argument stating that the rule
allowing all crimes to be shown did no injustice to the witness, thus
73. Minn. Stat. § 610.49 (1949).
74. See e.g., Brase v. Williams Sanatorium, Inc., 192 Minn. 304, 306,
256 N. W. 176, 177 (1934) ; Harding v. Great Northern Ry., 77 Minn. 417,
419, 80 N. W. 358, 359 (1899) ; State v. Sauer, 42 Minn. 258, 260, 44 N. W.
115, 116 (1890).
75. Carter v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co., 170 Minn. 250, 212 N. W. 413(1927).
76. Minn. Stat. § 169.94(2) (1949), Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn. 615,
11 N. W. 2d 258 (1943).
77. Minn. Stat. § 610.49 (1949).
78. Thompson v. Bankers Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 474, 151
N. W. 180 (1915) ; State v. Adamson, 43 Minn. 196, 200, 45 N. W. 152, 153(1890) (by implication).
79. State v. Palmer, 206 Minn. 185, 288 N. IfV. 160 (1939) ; State v.
Price, 135 Minn. 159, 160 N. W. 677 (1916).
80. State v. Skogman, 171 M1inn. 515, 213 N. IfV. 923 (1927) (memo-
randum decision).
81. State v. Bryant, 97 Minn. 8, 105 N. W. 974 (1905) ; State v. Rens-
wick, 85 Miinn. 19, 88 N. W. 22 (1901).
82. Brennan v. Minnesota D. & W. Ry., 130 Minn. 314, 153 N. W. 611(1915) ; State v. Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. W. 334 (1904).
83. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 520.
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avoiding the difficulty of defining infamous crimes.84 The Minne-
sota court has also stated that there is no room for inquiry under
the statute as to whether or not the crime is one which relates to
the credibility of the witness. "'
The justification for allowing any prior conviction to be shown
rests on the double assumption that the single conviction is a true
indication of bad moral character and, further, that bad moral
character has a substantial correlation with a readinesss to lie in a
particular case. s The first assumption encounters the difficulty of
being inconsistent with the theory of character evidence which
postulates that a long-standing reputation for such character, gained
mostly from successive acts, is the necessary basis for the intro-
duction of this type of evidence.8 7 The second assumption runs
afoul of the common sense realization that many crimes, for example,
simple assault, have little if any bearing on veracity. In addition,
as this type of impeachment is extremely embarrassing to the wit-
ness, it may well deter people from volunteering important testimony
in cases where their information is unknown to the parties.
Many jurisdictions limit the showing of prior convictions to
those crimes relating to truth and veracity.88 The Model Code of
Evidence restricts this type of impeachment to crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement."" While there will be some difficulty
in determining which crimes relate to untruthfulness or dishonesty,
all effort should not be abandoned for this reason. Convictions for
crimes such as perjury, fraud and embezzlement would be within
the scope of dishonesty or false statement, while murder and assault
would probably not be.8 0
The Model Code gives special treatment to the defendant in a
criminal case. If he does not offer evidence for the sole purpose
of supporting his credibility, his prior convictions may not be
84. Harding v. Great Northern Ry., 77 Minn. 417, 80 N. W. 358 (1899)(drunkenness).
85. See Thompson v. Bankers Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 474,
478, 151 N. W. 180, 181 (1915) (assault-attempting to kiss a married
woman).
86. See Gertz v. Fitchburgh R. R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) ; see Ladd,
Credibility Tests-Clrrent Trends, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 166, 176 (1940).
87. Id. at 177-178. The argument can be made that the convictions repre-
sent only the times that the witness was caught, but this seems much too
speculative a reason upon which to base a rule of law of general applicability.
88. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 987.
89. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106(1) (b) (1942).
90. See Ladd, Credibilit y Tesis-Currcnt Trends, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
166, 178-182 (1940). ,
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shown even though he testifies.91 The draftsmen of the Code have
found that the threat of this type of impeachment is one of the
main causes of defendants' refusing to testify and have included
this provision to encourage them to testify in their own behalf,
especially since under this Code failure to testify may be commented
on. Moreover, this type of impeaching evidence is believed to be
contantly misused by juries to prejudice the defendant on the
merits.02
Perhaps the most important aspect of this type of impeachment
as it exists today is the rehabilitation of the discredited witness. It
should always be emphasized that the witness has no motive to lie
in the given case. Even conceding that he is a hardened criminal,
if he has no interest in the outcome of the case, his testimony is in
all probability truthful. That the witness has been pardoned should
of course be brought out, and in general the attempt should be
made to show that the behavior of the witness since the time of his
conviction has been such as to merit trust and confidence. This
principle is well illustrated in State v. Storey,93 where it was prop-
erly brought out on redirect examination that after the witness had
served his sentence he was received into the employment of the
attorney who had prosecuted him. The length of time that has
elapsed since the crime is also important in restoring the credit
of the witness. This is best illustrated by Harris' classic account94
of an ill-advised impeachment. This same account also serves to
emphasize the fact that this type of impeachment is often unpopular
91. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106(3) (1942). If the defendant
introduces evidence for the sole purpose of affecting his credibility, convic-
tions involving dishonesty and false statement may be shown.
92. Id. comment.
93. 148 Minn. 398, 182 N. W. 613 (1921).
94. "I will give one instance out of many where character was once in
my hearing cruelly assailed in cross-examination by an inexperienced advo-
cate, and upon whom it recoiled with crushing severity. He asked a witness
if he had not been convicted of a felony. In vain the unfortunate victim in
the box protested that it had nothing to do with the case. 'Have you not
been convicted of felony?' persisted the counsel. 'Must I answer, my lord?'
'I am afraid you must,' answered his lordship. 'There is no help. It will be
better to answer it, as your refusal in any event would be as bad as the
answer.' 'I have,' murmured the witness, under a sense of shame and con-
fusion I never saw more painfully manifest. The triumphant counsel sat
down. Not long, however, was his satisfaction.
"In re-examination the witness was asked: 'When was it? A. Twenty-
nhiw years ago!' The judge: 'You were only a boy?'-Witness: 'Yes, my
lord.'
"It need scarcely be added that a just and manly indignation burst from
all parts of the Court, and the comments of the learned Judge were any-
thing but complimentary to the injudicious advocate." Harris's Hints on
Advocacy, 177-178 (18th ed. 1943).
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with the jury. Evidence of the good character of the witness is, of
course, admissible.95
V. GENERAL DEFECTS OF THE WITNESS
A proper and necessary function of impeachment is to discredit
the testimony of a witness by showing that the witness is incapable
of correctly observing, remembering, or narrating the facts to which
he testifies. Usually such defects as general faulty memory and
poor powers of observation caunot be shown by extrinsic evidence
but must rather be exposed by the cross-examiner while the wit-
ness is on the standY0 Evidence of insanity of a witness is admissible
if it can be shown to affect his powers of observation or recollec-
tion,97 but a merely ancestral or collateral insanity or prior illusions
of the witness which do not directly bear on his present testimony
may not be shown.98 Evidence of intoxication is admissible if it
directly affects his present testimony such as where the witness was
intoxicated at the time he observed the facts,9 9 but a mere habit
of intemperance cannot usually be shown. 00 In Minnesota, as in
most jurisdictions, religious belief cannot be commented upon as
indicating that the witness is not bound by the oath," 1 and of course
the race of the witness has no bearing on his veracity and comment
concerning this is precluded.'" 2
VI. IMPEACHMENT OF A PARTY'S OWN WITNESS
*With the exception of an adverse party called for cross-exami-
nationO 3 and a witness required by statute, such as an attesting
witness to a will,10 4 a party cannot impeach his own witness by a
showing of a prior inconsistent statement unless the party was sur-
95. See note 62 supra.
96. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 935, 995. In the latter section the author
has collected some excellent accounts to illustrate how effectively these
defects of a witness can be brought out on cross-examination.
97. See State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 495-496, 65 N. W. 63, 69-70(1895). The question of credibility is, of course, to be distinguished from that
of competency which is a preliminary matter for the court to decide.
98. State v. Hayward, 62 Mitn. 474, 65 N. W. 63 (1895).
99. Olstad v. Fahse, 204 Minn. 118, 282 N. W. 694 (1938) ; cf. State
v. Grear, 28 Minn. 426 (1881).
100. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 933. Cf. State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92 N.
W. 965 (1903) (evidence that a witness was an opium addict excluded).
101. State v. Peterson, 167 Minn. 216, 208 N. W. 761 (1926); see
Note, 9 N. C. L. Rev. 77 (1930).
102. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 937.
103. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.02 (1952).
104. Lott v. Lott, 174 Minn. 13, 218 N. W. 447, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 661
(1928).
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prised by the testimony.105 There are two reasons usually given for
this rule: that a party vouches for the credibility of his witness'0
and that a party should not have the means to coerce and control
the testimony of his witness.'10 7 The fallacy of the first reason, often
recognized by courts and writers, 08 is that with the exception of
expert and character witnesses the party has no choice but must
rather produce the witness who knows the facts. Wigmore disposes
of the second reason as being of "trifling practical weight" since it
would not affect the honest witness and the shifty witness should
be exposed in any case.109
A third reason advanced in support of the rule that has more
validity is that the jury may accept the impeaching statements as
substantive proof." 0 While this objection would hold true for the
introduction of prior inconsistent statements made by the oppon-
ent's witness as well as those of the party's own witness, in the
former situation the prior inconsistency also serves the legitimate
function of discrediting the adverse testimony of that witness, while
in the latter case, unless there was actual surprise,"' the only
purpose in having the witness testify would be to get the statement
before the jury. This distinction might well be reason enough to
warrant different treatment in the two situations, but in order to
properly consider this objection as a reason for retaining the rule
against impeaching one's own witness it is necessary to evaluate the
reasons for excluding the prior statement as substantive evidence.
The substantive objection is, of course, that the statements are
made ex parte out of court and are therefore hearsay. Wigmore
answers this by saying that the hearsay rule does not apply since
105. E.g., State v. Shea, 148 Minn. 368, 182 N. W. 445 (1921); Lind-
quist v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 369, 107 N. NV. 958 (1906) ; Selover v. Bryant,
54 Minn. 434, 56 N. W. 58 (1893).
106. See Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 437-438, 56 N. W. 58 (1893)
see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 898; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 603, 604 (1937).
107. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 899; Jones, Evidence § 853 (3d ed.
1924).
108. See Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 437-438, 56 N. W. 58 (1893);
see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 898; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness
-New Developments, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69, 77 (1936).
109. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 899; see also Ladd, Impeachment of One's
Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69, 80-86 (1936).
110. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 903. Wigmore believes this is not a
serious disadvantage and can be guarded against by proper instructions.
This argument is discussed at length in Ladd, Impeachnment of One's Own
Vitness-New Developments, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69, 86-88 (1936).
111. Where the party is actually surprised by the testimony, the prior
inconsistent statement legitimately serves to neutralize the adverse testi-
mony and discredit the witness.
19521
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the witness is now in court and subject to cross-examination.11 This
argument was rejected in State v. Saporen"3 where the court
stated in effect that the value of cross-examination is in striking
"while the iron is hot," that the right to cross-examine is greatly
impaired where the witness has time after making the statement
to consider its implications and fortify his position. This reasoning
has some merit where the witness is corroborating his present
testimony by prior consistent statements but not, at least to any
appreciable degree, where the witness is now disclaiming or re-
jecting his former utterance. In the latter case the reliability of the
ex parte statement will depend. on the truth of his present statement
and his explanation of the inconsistency both of which are subject
to immediate cross-examination.
A party may always impeach his own witness if he is surprised
by the testimony.114 While in theory the testimony must be actually
unexpected, in practice the question of whether a surprise exists is
left in the nearly unfettered discretion of the trial court." The
situation faced by the Minnesota court is that in many cases the
prior inconsistent statements are both reliable and essential evi-
dence, but in some cases, at least under the Saporen doctrine, the
statements are too unreliable to be considered by the jury. The
present solution to this dilemma is by means of the elastic surprise
doctrine. It would seem that a much more direct and satisfactory
approach would be to have the trial judge exercise the same latitude
of discretion that he now exercises in determining whether surprise
exists in determining whether to call the witness as a court's wit-
ness, thereby allowing both pa:rties to cross-examine and impeach.""
The practical needs and supposed dangers of introducing the
prior inconsistent statements of a party's own witness are illus-
trated by two Minnesota cases decided just one year apart. In
112. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 903, 1018.
113. 205 Minn. 358, 361-362, 285 N. W. 898, 900-901 (1939).
114. See note 105 srupra.
115. In State v. Bauer, 189 Minn. 280, 249 N. W. 40 (1933), a convic-
tion for carnal knowledge, the prosecuting witness testified that the de-
fendant was innocent of the crime and the state claimed surprise. The de-
fendant established, however, that the witness had informed the county
attorney's office of what her testimony would be ten days before the trial.
In affirming the finding that surprise existed the court stated that notice to
one member of the county attorney's office was not notice to the one trying
the case.
116. This method has been approved in the federal courts and in a
minority of states. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 918. See especially Young v.
United States, 97 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938); United States v. Young, 26
F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Texas 1939).
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State v. Saporen,"1 a prosecution for carnal knowledge, the state
on a plea of surprise impeached a witness who had made a former
statement implicating the defendant. This witness had pleaded
guilty to a similar charge and the dispostion of his case was still
pending. On cross-examination the witness claimed that the prior
statement had been extracted from his under a threat of seven years
in the reformatory if he did not "say something against the defend-
ant." The conviction was reversed because the impeaching state-
ment went beyond the subject matter of the adverse testimony of
the witness and in respect to the surprise the court stated, "It was
for the trial judge to determine whether the asserted and naive
lack of suspicion of a change of heart by [the witness] was well-
founded."
In the similar case of State v. Jl cClain,"x8 also a conviction for
carnal knowledge, the prosecuting witness, who had previously
signed a statement admitting the intercourse and identifying the
defendant, testified to both her own and the defendant's innocence.
The state claimed surprise and while this was contested by the
defendant, 119 the prior inconsistent statement was allowed. In
affirming the conviction the court stated in respect to the surprise:
"If the trial judge suspected that... the girl... [was] by per-
jury attempting to obstruct justice, that someone had done a
finished job of 'fixing' the witnesses for the state, there is scant
ground in the record for disagreement. When a defendant finds
himself in such a predicament, he must expect a liberal exercise
of the court's discretion against him.'
1 20
The McClain case illustrates the necessity of showing the prior
inconsistent statements of witnesses, while the Saporen case is an
example of the possible attending danger of allowing impeaching
statements allegedly gained through "third degree" methods to
be brought out to the jury, although it would seem that this danger
is offset, at least insofar as the law should attempt to offset it, by
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness who is then in court
While the illustrations used are criminal cases the same consider-
ations apply, though perhaps to a lesser degree, in civil cases.'
2
'
There are apparently no decisions in this jurisdiction which
117. 205 Minn. 358,285 N. W.898 (1939).
118. 208 Minn. 91, 292 N. XV. 753 (1940). Justice Stone wrote the
majority opinion in both cases.
119. Transcript of Record, p. 22, State v. McClain, 208 Minn. 91, 292
N. W. 753 (1940).
120. State v. McClain, 208 Mim. 91, 93, 292 N. W. 753, 754 (1940).
121. See State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N. W. 898, 901
(1939) ; see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 918.
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restrict the showing of bias, interest, or corruption of a party's
own witness, and the writers are uniform in urging that this type
of impeachment be allowed. 12 2 There is a dictum in an early Min-
nesota case'12 3 stating that the bad reputation for truthfullness of
the party's own witness should not be allowed, and while there
are divergent views' 24 expressed by the courts and the writers both
as to reputation and prior misconduct, the need for this type of im-
peachment is much less urgent.
VII. SUGGESTED REFORM
The time when science will be able accurately to detect the
untruthful witness is apparently quite remote,1 25 and until that
time the credibility of witnesses must be determined in the more
traditional methods. These methods can be enhanced, however, by
a careful evaluation of the existing rules that govern them. There
are many areas, as indicated throughout this Note, in which the
rules that have developed and that are presently followed have no
substantial justification for continued use today. The most notable
of these are the rule against a party's impeaching his own witness,
the rule of The Quwen's Case and the rule allowing all types
of prior convictions to be shown. Since the latter rule is statutory
and the former rules are firmly imbedded in precedent, legisla-
tive revision would seem to be the most simple and direct method
of reform. The adoption, either in toto or in part, of Rule 106
of the Model Code of Evidence 26 should be seriously considered.
122. 3 id. § 901; Ladd, Iinpeachment of One's Own, Witness-New
Developments, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69, 91-96 (1936). The Model Code of
Evidence, Rule 106(1) (1942) allows the party producing the witness to
impeach him in the same manner as the opposing party.
123. Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 437, 56 N. W. 58 (1893).
124. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 900; Ladd, Impeachment of One's
Ozw Witness-New Developments, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69, 91-96 (1936).
125. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 997-999a; Ladd, Techniques and
Theory of Character Testimony, 24 'Iowa L. Rev. 498, 535 (1939) ; Note, 53
Harv. L. Rev. 285 (1939).
126. "Rule 106. Evidence Affecting Credibility.
"(1) Subject to Paragraphs (2) and (3), for the purpose of impair-
ing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including a party
calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning
any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his
credibility as a witness, and need not, in examining him as to a statement
made by him in writing inconsistent with any part of his testimony, show
or read to him any part of the writing, except that extrinsic evidence shall
be inadmissible
"(a) of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity or their
opposites, or
"(b) of his conviction of crime not involving dishonesty or false state-
ment, or
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"(c) of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to
prove a trait of his character.
"(2) The judge in his discretion may exclude extrinsic evidence of a
written or oral statement of the witness offered under Paragraph (1) un-
less the witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an oppor-
tunity to deny or explain the statement.
"(3) If an accused who testifies at the trial introduces no evidence for
the sole purpose of supporting his credibility, no evidence concerning his
commission or conviction of crime shall, for the sole purpose of impairing
his credibility, be elicited on his cross-examination or be otherwise intro-
duced against him; if he introduces evidence for the sole purpose of sup-
porting his credibility, all evidence admissible under Paragraph (1) shall
be admissible against him."
For a criticism of this rule, however, see Wigmore, The Anmerican Law
Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A. B. A. J. 23 (1942).
